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Classic and more recent phenomenological works provide rich accounts of our experience of 
the body and of its relation to the world.1 In this chapter I pull out one thread from this 
literature, focusing on the phenomenon of incorporation: literally, the capacity of the body to 
take something else into itself. As we will see, to date this phenomenon has been discussed 
primarily, if not exclusively, in relation to our sensorimotor capacities. The aim of this 
chapter is to show that not just the sensorimotor body (the perceiving and moving body) but 
the affective body too is subject to the process of incorporation.  
 To show this, I proceed as follows. In section 2 I introduce the phenomenon of 
incorporation, as described in particular in Merleau-Ponty and more recently Ihde.2 As I point 
out, Merleau-Ponty appears to use the term in two closely related but different ways: to refer, 
generally, to the acquisition of a variety of habitual bodily skills; and, more specifically, to 
refer to the integration of material objects into habitual bodily skills. To distinguish between 
these two senses of incorporation, I call the first phenomenon habit-incorporation and the 
second object-incorporation. In section 2 I also briefly refer to Ihde’s Technics and Praxis to 
characterize object-incorporation in more detail, and to introduce some terminology and 
notation that will be useful in the subsequent discussion. After these introductory 
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considerations, I turn to affectivity and show how the notion of incorporation, in both its 
general and specific sense, applies to affective states. In section 3 I discuss the case of 
affective habit-incorporation. I do so rather swiftly because, as I point out, this phenomenon is 
ubiquitous and not particularly difficult to identify. The case of affective object-incorporation 
(the integration of material objects into the affective body), on the other hand, is less obvious 
and more challenging to characterize and recognize. In section 4 I argue that this phenomenon 
however does exist, and provide two examples to illustrate it. In this way, we will see that a 
classical debate can be renewed and invigorated today such that new spaces might open up for 
the future of phenomenological research into affectivity and embodiment.   
 
2. Incorporation into the Sensorimotor Body 
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes the phenomenon of incorporation 
as part of his discussion of the body schema (schéma corporel)3 and the habitual body. The 
notion of the body schema refers to the body experienced not as an object but as a subject of 
awareness; the body schema, in other words, is the lived body, i.e., one’s own body 
experienced from the first-person perspective. While not itself an object of awareness, the 
lived body is the condition of possibility for our experience of objects in the world.4 As 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, the body schema is the ‘zone of non-being in front of which precise 
beings, features, and points can appear.’5 Because the body schema cannot be observed, it is 
also said to be ‘non-thematic’ or ‘non-positional.’ 
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the body schema is subject to a process of 
sedimentation, during which certain bodily habits develop and become part of our style of 
being-in-the-world.6 This process is made apparent in neuropsychological conditions such as 
the phantom limb syndrome (occurring when people who undergo limb amputation retain 
awareness of the missing limb). Merleau-Ponty explains this phenomenon as the 
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sedimentation of a certain habitual awareness of ourselves and of our relation to the world. 
When a limb is amputated, this habitual awareness does not suddenly change; the amputee 
retains a certain way of relating to the world and of knowing the world through her body. 
 The notion of sedimentation is closely related to the one of incorporation, in its most 
general sense. Incorporation is the acquisition, through a gradual process of sedimentation, of 
bodily habits and skills that, as such, are enacted spontaneously, without reflection. When one 
has acquired the capacity to walk down the stairs, for example, one does so spontaneously, 
without attending to one’s legs or feet, and without thinking how to move each of them in 
turn. The body schema has taken into itself (incorporated) the ability to walk down the stairs, 
and just puts this ability into practice when needed. This is likewise the case for more 
complex skills that we might acquire later in life, such as dancing the waltz or climbing grade 
7b (these are my examples). Although complex activities are rarely if ever performed entirely 
“automatically”, and always arguably involve a degree of conscious monitoring, they still 
necessarily depend on having acquired bodily habits that are then recruited during the activity 
(e.g., climbing grade 7b requires the ability to perform moves such as feet swapping, 
crimping, and flagging). Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the incorporation of bodily habits is 
never a matter of acquiring customs or routines involving mechanical and inflexible responses 
to stimuli. Rather the habitual body always retains a degree of adaptivity, spontaneity and 
freedom. Thus, once we have acquired the capacity to walk down the stairs, we can walk 
down stairs of different degrees of steepness and with differently-sized steps (for example). 
 I call this general sense of incorporation habit-incorporation, to distinguish it from a 
more specific use that Merleau-Ponty makes of the same term. This more specific use refers 
to the integration of material objects into the body schema, and I thus call it object-
incorporation. Merleau-Ponty introduces the phenomenon with the following examples:  
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Without any explicit calculation, a woman maintains a safe distance between the feather 
in her hat and objects that might damage it; she senses where the feather is, just as we 
sense where our hand is. If I possess the habit of driving a car, then I enter into a lane 
and see that ‘I can pass’ without comparing the width of the lane to that of the fender, 
just as I go through a door without comparing the width of the door to that of my body.7  
Just like the body schema, the hat and the car in these examples are not objects of experience, 
but rather that which enables a certain experience of the world: ‘The hat and the automobile 
have ceased to be objects whose size and volume would be determined through a comparison 
with other objects. They have become voluminous powers.’8 Similarly,  
The blind man’s cane has ceased to be an object for him, it is no longer perceived for 
itself; rather, the cane’s furthest point is transformed into a sensitive zone, it increases 
the scope and the radius of the act of touching and has become analogous to a gaze.9  
Object-incorporation can be seen as a special form of habit-incorporation; it refers to cases in 
which our body schema has acquired specific habits by integrating material objects into itself.  
 As others have noted already,10 the phenomenon of object-incorporation finds support 
in recent empirical evidence suggesting that tool use changes the way in which the brain 
responds to stimuli. We know for example that some neurons in the intraparietal cortex of 
Japanese macaques respond to visual stimuli applied at the hand, as well as near the hand. 
Once the macaque learns to pull food closer by using a rake, some of these neurons also 
respond when visual stimuli are presented near the rake. In the case of humans (where single-
neuron recording is not possible), experimenters have found that wielding tools in a crossed 
position generates behavioral effects similar to those shown when the hands themselves are 
crossed. For example, judgments of the temporal order of vibrations applied to the far tip of 
crossed hand-held sticks are disrupted to a similar degree to when the vibrations are applied to 
crossed hands.11 
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 The phenomenon of object-incorporation has also been discussed and elaborated in the 
field now known as ‘postphenomenology.’ This term, originally proposed by the philosopher 
of technology Don Ihde, refers broadly to the application of phenomenological methods and 
descriptions to the examination of our relations to technological artifacts.12 Drawing on 
Merleau-Ponty (as well as Husserl and Heidegger), Ihde has described how technologies 
mediate our experience, by modifying how we are intentionally related to the world.13 In 
particular, his notion of embodiment relations corresponds to what I have called ‘object-
incorporation.’ In embodiment relations, artifacts are not thematized. When I write on a 
blackboard using a piece of chalk, for example, the chalk is not the intentional object of my 
awareness—it is not the ‘terminus’ of my experience.14 Instead, the piece of chalk is 
experienced as that through which the blackboard is given to me in the way it does (e.g., as 
hard and smooth). Ihde also points out that in embodiment relations artifacts are characterized 
by transparency or quasi-transparency—namely, they are not the main focus of attention but 
they ‘withdraw’ from experience, partially if not entirely. Ihde captures this relation formally 
with the following notation: 
  
(human-artefact) à world 
 
This notation indicates that the artifact is not itself the object of the intentional relation. 
Rather, the artifact is part of that which does the intending. 
 
3. Affective Habit-incorporation  
The preceding accounts describe incorporation (of some ability or object) within the 
sensorimotor body, i.e., the perceiving and moving body. In the remaining of this chapter I 
suggest that it is possible to talk of incorporation also in the affective domain, both in the 
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general sense of habit-incorporation (this section), and in the more specific sense of object-
incorporation (next section). 
 Before proceeding, I need to clarify what I mean by ‘affectivity.’ I use the term in a 
general way, to refer to the capacity as well as the condition of being affected (literally, ‘done 
something’) by something. Being affective, in this general sense, is incompatible with being 
indifferent, deprived of any interest, concern, or care for one’s existence and/or world. 
Paradigmatic affective states—states that most clearly display this lack of indifference—are 
emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, guilty, shame, etc.), moods (feeling up or down, 
being cranky, grumpy, having the blues, etc.), and motivational states (fatigue, hunger, pain, 
etc.). Although there is no agreement among affective theorists on how to define these states, 
I think it is fair to say that it is not controversial to classify them all as ‘affective.’ 
Accordingly, in the rest of this chapter I discuss the possibility of incorporating skills and 
objects into affective states conceived in this broad way.15   
 Let us then consider, first, whether and how affective habits and skills can be 
incorporated. This case is fairly straightforward. Just think of the many bodily ways of 
expressing specific emotions that we acquire during our lifetime. We know from empirical 
research that some facial expressions of emotions appear very early in development.16 Yet as 
life progresses we acquire a repertoire of further facial expressions, as well as vocalizations 
and bodily gestures, that are dependent on our environment and culture. Cross-cultural studies 
of emotion expression have focused primarily on identifying pancultural facial expressions17; 
yet whoever has travelled in different countries will have noted that there are cultural 
variations in the way emotions are expressed in the face and rest of the body. Just to give an 
example from my own experience, in my country of origin (Italy), but not in the country I live 
(the UK), spreading the arms and slightly tilting the neck backwards and sideways expresses a 
form of exasperation (a typical vocalization and facial expression usually accompany the 
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gesture as well).18 We can talk here of the sedimentation of a certain affective style,19 or the 
incorporation of an affective communicative gesture into one’s habitual body. As was the case 
for Merleau-Ponty’s sensorimotor skills (such as walking down the stairs), this bodily habit 
exhibits regularity and flexibility at the same time. It is ‘activated’ in certain contexts, but it is 
not just a reflex or conditioned response; I modulate it depending on whom I talk to—e.g., I 
might perform a more restrained version of the gesture in a relatively formal setting, and a 
more exaggerated version in an informal setting, especially one that invites emphasizing one’s 
origins (when I interact with other Italians abroad, performing this and other culture-specific 
attitudes is sometimes a way of bodily-making the point, by exhibiting and sharing a gesture 
that is mutually understood, that we are now ‘between us’). At the same time, the habit 
remains spontaneous; I do not first think ‘now I will act exasperated’ and then perform the 
gesture, rather I experience the social context as inviting or affording that gesture (in a 
restrained or exaggerated way), and I accordingly ‘go with it,’ in a continuous stream of 
experience and action where there is no moment of ‘deciding’ distinct from and preceding the 
moment of ‘doing.’ Likewise, with the same spontaneity and lack of antecedent reflection, I 
do not perform that gesture when I interact with British people, because I usually do not 
experience those interactions as inviting that kind of behavior.  
 Incorporating an affective style in the sense just specified is, importantly, not only a 
matter of acquiring a way of performing a gesture but also of undergoing an affective 
experience while doing so. Indeed that is what warrants talking of an affective style in the first 
place. Performing the gesture of exasperation mentioned above comes with a specific feeling 
that is at the same time an affective feeling and a feeling of how the body is moving—indeed 
the two are not distinct, rather the way my body feels as I spread my arms and tilt my neck is 
part of how it feels to act exasperated. The point of these considerations is that affective habit-
incorporation is not just a matter of taking into the body a certain way of outwardly 
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expressing some emotion (for example), but also a matter of inwardly acquiring a bodily-
affective way of feeling. The acquisition of an affective style affects both how our body 
appears to others, as well as how it is experienced in the first person.  
 Much more could be said about the incorporation of affective habits. For one, not only 
emotions but also moods and arguably motivational states come with characteristic bodily 
attitudes and experiences that appear to change and sediment over time. Indeed, the 
development of one’s personality can be seen as including a process of affective 
incorporation, in the sense of the gradual acquisition of several dispositions to respond 
affectively in specific ways. And there is also the interesting phenomenon of how 
professional performers, such as actors and dancers, come to incorporate a variety of affective 
styles in their repertoire. The aim of this chapter, however, is only to begin sketching the 
phenomenon of affective incorporation, and to this end I now move on to the other, more 
specific sense of incorporation identified earlier: the one of object-incorporation. 
 
4. Affective Object-incorporation 
I now propose that it is possible to talk of the integration of material objects into bodily-
affective episodes. This phenomenon is less obvious than the one of affective habit-
incorporation. To introduce it and characterize it in some detail, in this section I offer two 
examples.    
 
Example One: The Hikers 
Central to the first example is the consideration that affectivity is not just a state of the body 
(a pattern of changes in the physiological body and/or in bodily feelings), but a way in which 
the world, or parts of it, are given or ‘show up’ in experience for the subject. Consider, for 
instance, how the world shows up in moods, which are often characterized as affective states 
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that are not intentionally directed at anything in particular.20 In spite of this lack of specificity 
of the intentional object, arguably moods remain ‘open’ to the world, in the sense that they 
involve a reference to something ‘other.’ Different moods change the affective character of 
the world, i.e., how the world affects or strikes the subject. Using a term influential in 
psychology in the 1930s,21 we can say that different moods change the ‘invitation’ or 
‘demand’ character of the world, namely, the extent to which the world is experienced as 
repelling or attracting.22 In a downward or depressed mood the world appears flat and invites 
little or no interaction, whereas in an energized mood, the world appears more inviting and 
enticing. There is no reason why this kind of analysis could not be applied to other affective 
episodes too, such as emotional and motivational ones. Unlike moods, emotional episodes are 
typically regarded as being about specific objects, events, or situations. Phenomenologically, 
we may say that emotion experiences are more focused, and whereas it is not ‘the world in 
general’ that affects or strikes the subject in a specific way during an emotional episode, we 
can still talk of parts of the world that show up in specific ways during an emotion, notably as 
inviting certain actions and deterring others. Thus in fear, the feared object may invite moving 
away from it; in anger, parts of the world may invite hitting and punching; in attraction, they 
may invite touching and kissing, and so on.23 Likewise for motivational states such as hunger, 
thirst, or pain. These states involve clear felt tendencies or urges toward or away from 
something, and correlatively influence how parts of the world are experienced.24   
 Importantly for present purposes, the ways in which the world is given in experience 
in all these affective states depend in a constitutive way on one’s bodily self-awareness, such 
as awareness of the possibilities of action that are available to one’s own body—or so I want 
to suggest. Consider for example how differently a steep ascending flight of stairs shows up 
for you depending on whether you are fatigued or energized. When you are fatigued, it looks 
daunting and uninviting; this look, I claim, depends on the experience you have of your body 
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as fatigued and thus unable, or only able with significant effort, to climb up the stairs. On the 
other hand, when you are energized—perhaps you are out for a run and you feel full of 
strength—the stairs do not look so daunting, they might even look inviting and stimulating; 
again, it is the awareness you have of your body as strong, energized and ‘ready to go’ that 
makes the stairs show up in experience in this way. In recent work, I have suggested the 
metaphor of looking at the world through a colored but still transparent window to capture 
this idea that it is through a certain experience of one’s own body (the colored window) that 
we experience the world as affecting us in one way or the other.25  
 We can trace the idea that the affective character of the world depends constitutively 
on the character of the lived body in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of sexuality, which he 
regarded as falling squarely within the ‘affective milieu.’26 Merleau-Ponty argues that the 
sexual body (characterized as Freudian Eros or Libido) is what constitutes the world as erotic, 
as offering sexual possibilities; it ‘gives external stimuli a sexual value or signification.’27 
Erotic ‘comprehension’ is not intellectual understanding, but ‘the power of projecting before 
[oneself] a sexual world.’28 Patients who suffer from sexual inertia, who are not able to act 
upon their sexual desires and to follow through a sexual act, correlatively lack ‘sexual 
intentionality,’ they fail to project or constitute people as erotic and as inviting sexual 
interactions.29 
 We are now in a position to introduce one way in which material objects can be 
incorporated into affective episodes. Consider the following example. Stevie and Frankie are 
two hikers with the same level of expertise, health, and fitness. They are at the top of a 
mountain, at the beginning of a steep downhill path covered with small stones and gravel. 
Stevie is wearing sturdy hiking boots, whereas Frankie is wearing light tennis shoes with a 
flat sole. As they begin walking down and feeling the terrain with their feet, Stevie feels 
confident and safe, whereas Frankie feels unsecure and afraid. As Frankie puts her feet down, 
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she feels she can easily slip, and the path shows up for her as treacherous and dangerous. 
Stevie on the other hand feels he can walk down confidently, securely placing his feet on the 
ground, and the path appears safe and walkable to him. None of them, I contend, are attending 
to their shoes as they walk down (at least, this seems to me what happens when one climbs 
down a steep mountain path). Nor, however, are the shoes entirely absent from the hikers’ 
awareness. Rather, it seems appropriate to characterize the shoes as quasi-transparent, i.e., as 
‘withdrawn’ from experience (not attended, not taken as an intentional object) but still present 
in it as that through which the path shows up for the hikers in the way it does. Specifically, 
wearing sturdy boots compared to light flat shoes alters the implicit sense of one’s 
possibilities of action in relation to the path. Borrowing a term from ecological psychology, 
we can say that wearing different shoes changes awareness of one’s effectivities—the set of 
motor skills that one possesses and that correlate with awareness of what actions the world 
invites or affords.30 In sum, I suggest that we have here a case where two different affective 
worlds are ‘projected’ by two subjects through the integration of different material objects 
into their body schema. The structure of this example is the same as the one of cases of 
object-incorporation in the sensorimotor domain, namely: (human-artifact) à world.  
 Before considering another example, let me reply to a possible objection or perplexity. 
One could argue that the example just given is one in which the shoes are incorporated into 
the hikers’ perceptual (tactile) experience of the path, but not in their emotional state; the 
latter is simply a feeling (of fear, or of confidence) caused by the hikers’ different perception 
of the qualities of the path. The problem with this account, in my view, is that it artificially 
isolates the perceptual component of the experience from the affective one, leaving the latter 
dangling, unanalyzed, at the end of a causal sequence of psychological states. As such, this 
account is not a description of affective experience. But such a description is precisely what I 
am after. In particular I aimed to provide a phenomenologically appropriate characterization 
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of the affective experience of the hikers, and of how their body, the shoes and the path feature 
in it. To retort that the affective experience is a mere feeling that comes after the perception of 
the path (as either slippery or not) fails to take into account that affective feelings maintain a 
connection to the world by influencing how the world is given in experience.  
 Likewise, redescribing the example of the hikers as one where two different emotions 
are caused by a cognitive evaluation (or appraisal) of the situation would not provide a 
satisfactory account of the experience of those emotions. Suppose one said that Frankie 
judges that it is dangerous to walk down with light flat shoes, and accordingly becomes 
worried or scared. Again, this account says nothing about Frankie’s actual experience of 
worry or fear. It leaves this experience dangling at the end of a causal sequence of non-
affective psychological processes (a perception, leading to an appraisal, leading to a feeling), 
and provides no description of how the body and the world feature in it.  
 
Example Two: The Instrumental Musician 
Consider next the example of a professional instrumental musician, who sets out to play to 
regulate her affective state—e.g., she would like to calm down, or to feel more motivated and 
energized, or might want to ‘vent’ or give voice to a specific affective state, such as sadness 
or longing. For present purposes it does not matter whether or not the musician already feels 
something specific before playing, and whether and how playing changes this initial feeling. 
All that the example requires is that the musician engages in the activity of playing in order to 
influence (change, amplify, dampen, etc.) what she is feeling (including feeling nothing in 
particular).31 Also, we can imagine that the musician either improvises, or plays a piece 
composed by someone else. I am not a professional musician but I certainly sometimes play 
the piano to regulate my affective state. And apparently professional musicians do this too. 
Here is, for example, what the pianist Cristina Ortiz said of her relation to the piano: 
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Somebody took a piano from me, it would be my death, because I live through the 
piano. Whatever happens in my life—depression, pressure, happiness, or the loss of 
mother or father …—I go to the piano, and my soul comes through [the] pieces I choose 
to portray that emotion.32   
The question of how affect and music relate to each other is notoriously a difficult and much-
debated one (there is a whole Handbook dedicated to the topic33). We know from empirical 
research that music influences the listener’s affective state.34 One way in which playing an 
instrument affects the performer’s affective state is thus in virtue of the performer hearing the 
music he plays. Yet aside from this empirical fact it is hard to characterize the nature of the 
music-induced affective state. In particular, what is it about? Is it about anything at all? Is it 
about the music, about affect itself, about both, or about something else? For present purposes 
we can leave aside these complex philosophical questions,35 and focus instead on the 
musician’s first-personal experience of playing an instrument and of being affected in the act 
of playing—not just by the quality of the music he plays, but more generally by the act of 
engaging in a music-producing performance. 
 The question of interest here, then, is: how does the musician experience the 
instrument while playing? My suggestion is that the instrument is experienced as that through 
which a certain affective state is realized, created, or even better ‘articulated’ in the 
performance. In this process, the instrument is not taken as an intentional object, but neither is 
it incorporated only into the musician’s sensorimotor schema. Undoubtedly, the skilled pianist 
does not pay attention to how distant the next key is from the one she is currently pressing, or 
to the location of the pedals; her body has incorporated a complex set of sensorimotor skills 
so that she can pre-reflectively reach for various parts of the instrument without having to 
focus on them. And yet, a musical performance is not just a sensorimotor activity; 
accordingly, I want to suggest, the instrument is not incorporated only into the sensorimotor 
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schema. While performing (in the context delineated in the example), the musician is 
affectively touched by what she plays, and she is also motivated to play in a certain affective 
way (a way that will strike her as so or so). We can say that the musician’s body has not just a 
motor intentionality, but an affective intentionality as well.36 As the musician plays, she is 
striving to create, or articulate, a certain affective state. By ‘articulating’ an affective state I 
mean supporting how it unfolds in real time, by being receptive to it from moment to 
moment, and by sustaining it with what and how one plays next. During this process of 
affective articulation, the musician experiences her body in complex ways: the lived body 
may alternate between being very much ‘at the front’ and conspicuous in awareness, and 
being inconspicuous and in the background.37 It is unlikely that the instrument will be 
experienced in the same complex way. After all, unlike the body, the instrument is not 
traversed by a nervous system and thus cannot be the source of proprioceptive and kinesthetic 
sensations. So one cannot feel ‘shivers down the instrument,’ for instance, like one feels 
shivers down the spine. Likewise, whereas one can feel one’s own body as being the locus of 
a motor intention or urge to act, it does not seem possible to feel the instrument in this way. 
And yet, I suggest, there is a sense in which the instrument is experienced as the body is—
namely as that which makes the articulation and creation of an affective state possible. The 
instrument, like the body, is experienced as that through which the musician can let herself 
‘go through’ a certain affective process. 
 One may retort at this point that this example does not fit the structure ‘(human-
artifact) à world’ because the complex ‘(human-instrument)’, unlike instances of sensory 
perception, does not intend a specific aspect of the world. As mentioned earlier, it is indeed 
difficult to say what music is about; in addition, it is difficult to say what the musician’s 
affective state while playing is about. One possibility might be that the musician’s affective 
state is a mood that, as such, is not about anything in particular. I do not think this is the case, 
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however, because when one is playing one’s experience can be (and mostly is, I would say) 
directed at quite specific objects, such as the music one is playing, and (at least in the example 
given in this section) at how the music is affecting one. So I think that what makes it hard to 
see how the example fits the structure ‘(human-artifact) à world’ is the complexity of the 
intentional object of the experience. This difficulty, however, does not pertain to the 
‘intending’ side of the formula, namely to ‘(human-artifact) à …’. What I argued above is 
that in the given example the instrument is not the intentional object of the experience (i.e., it 
is not the case that ‘human à instrument’), but should be regarded as incorporated into the 
activity of intending something. The fact that this something is difficult to characterize and 
may be shifting does not affect the incorporated status of the instrument.   
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I aimed to delineate some of the ways in which the affective body can 
incorporate something else—from habits and skills, to material objects. I did so by building 
upon existing discussions of incorporation in the sensorimotor domain, specifically by 
Merleau-Ponty and Ihde.  
 Much more remains to be said about the phenomenon of affective incorporation, both 
in the sense of acquisition of bodily-affective habits and skills, and in the sense of integration 
of material objects into the affective body. This is because affectivity is a complex and multi-
faceted domain, and the body enters in it in various ways. For reasons of space, I have not 
said anything here about, for example, the incorporation of objects into the ‘body image,’ 
namely, into our conscious image of how our body appears to others.38 I have not discussed 
either the possibility of incorporating objects (such as drugs) into the physiological dimension 
of affectivity. Habits, skills and objects could also be incorporated into one’s personality, and 
even into one’s sense of self and personal identity. In spite of the preliminary nature of the 
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present discussion, I hope to have demonstrated one way in which we can take classic 
phenomenological themes further into the Twenty-First century.39  
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